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NAVIGATING THE MISTS OF METAPHOR: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
BOYCE L. GRAHAM
A FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT of corporation law is
that a corporation is a separate legal entity.' As such,
the corporation alone, not its stockholders, is liable for
the debts and torts of the corporation, with certain qualifi-
cations. Because of the risks of massive liability extant in
the aviation business, the popularity of the corporate form
of enterprise is not surprising among air carriers, aircraft
manufacturers, and related businesses. Other considera-
tions such as sources of capitalization and tax advantages
also influence the decision to incorporate a business, but
the limitation of liability to the assets of the corporation
itself is one of the extraordinary characteristics of the cor-
porate entity.2 "Limited liability is the rule, not the ex-
ception; and on that assumption large undertakings are
rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of
capital attracted." 3
The limitation of liability is not absolute, however. A
dark cloud looms over the corporate form: the doctrine
I Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098,
1102 (5th Cir. 1973); 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS §§ 5, 14 (rev. perm. ed. 1990); 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 8, 414 (1990); 18
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1 (1985). A corporation is "an artificial juridical per-
son," which can sue and be sued, make contracts, buy, hold, and sell real estate,
and has the "capacity of perpetual succession." Id.
2 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5.
1 Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1943).
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known metaphorically as "piercing the corporate veil." 4
Formally stated as "disregard of the corporate entity,"5
the doctrine is an equitable remedy6 which courts may
apply when continued recognition of the separate corpo-
rate entity would promote or protect fraud or injustice, or
contravene public policy or convenience.7 The effect of
the remedy is to pierce the veil of limited liability that nor-
mally shields shareholders of a corporation from personal
liability for corporate acts. Courts tend to be reluctant
and cautious about piercing the corporate veil, however,
because limited liability is a legitimate purpose and a ma-
jor incentive to form a corporation.8
Courts may consider a number of factors in deciding
whether to disregard the corporate entity in any given
case, 9 but there is "no precise formula" for the determi-
nation.10 This comment analyzes the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil primarily as it affects the field of avia-
tion. The analysis begins with a discussion of the various
incarnations of the doctrine." Next, the comment fo-
cuses on the applicability of the doctrine in cases involv-
ing tort liability, 12  contractual liability,' 3  and labor
4 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.
Id. § 41.25.
Id. § 41.25.
I d. § 41; see 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 9 (1990).
H I W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.30, at 662, 664.
11 Id.; see Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 161 (7th
Cir. 1963).
,",1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.30, at 661. At least one commentator has
criticized the present state of authority. See Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Should Corporate Owners Have It Both Ways? 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667 (1989).
"Courts generally have contributed little toward developing a coherent set of
principles to govern corporate veil-piercing theory.... No universal test or the-
ory to determine the propriety of piercing the corporate veil exists. . . .[TIhe
various veil-piercing theories .. .suffer[] from a number of inadequacies." Id. at
677-79. For a discussion of reverse piercing the corporate veil, see infra notes 98-
129, 186-196 and accompanying text.
I For a general discussion of the doctrine, see infra notes 16-44 and accompa-
nying text.
12 For applications of the doctrine in tort cases, see infra notes 45-122 and ac-
companying text.




relations.' 4 Finally, the comment examines a recent statu-
tory development limiting the use of the veil-piercing
remedy. i5
I. DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY: A RULE BY
ANY OTHER NAME WOULD CuT As DEEP
As with other legal theories and doctrines, the courts
and commentators have created several labels for the doc-
trine of disregard of the corporate entity. The metaphor
"piercing the corporate veil" is frequently used both in
treatises' 6 and court opinions to describe the doctrine.' 7
Either of the foregoing terms is suitable in the broader
context, whether the matter involves a parent corporation
and its subsidiary, two or more corporations related by
common shareholders, directors or management, or a
close corporation and its sole shareholder.
In narrower contexts, courts often use such labels as
"instrumentality rule" and "alter ego theory." The "in-
strumentality" label usually refers to the parent-subsidi-
ary context in which the subsidiary is found to be the
mere instrumentality of the parent corporation.' 8 The
"alter ego" label describes the case where one or more
individual shareholders use the corporation as a shell to
conduct personal transactions. 19 According to one au-
,4 For a discussion of corporate disregard in the context of labor relations, see
infta notes 219-238 and accompanying text.
1- For a discussion of recent amendments to the Texas Business Corporation
Act, see infra notes 250-261 and accompanying text.
16 See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 41-48; H. BALLANTINE, BALLAN-
TINE ON CORPORATIONS § 122 (1946).
17 See, e.g., De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984) (using
both the "piercing the corporate veil" metaphor and "disregard of corporate en-
tity"); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979) (both
"piercing" and "disregard" used in opinion); Transportes Aereos de Angola v.
Ronair, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 102 (D. Del. 1988) (court uses "piercing" and "disre-
gard the corporate form"); Wilcox v. Precision Parachute Co., 685 F. Supp. 821
(D. Kan. 1988) ("piercing" and "disregard" language; "alter ego" and "instru-
mentality" also used interchangeably); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270
(Tex. 1986) (compare majority's consistent phrase, "disregard the corporate fic-
tion," with dissent's use of "piercing the corporate veil").
I 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43.10.
Id. § 41.10.
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thority, "instrumentality" is not an apt word to use in the
context of disregarding the corporate entity, because
every corporation is, in a sense, the instrumentality of its
stockholders.2 0  Practically speaking, however, "instru-
mentality" is interchangeable with "alter ego.' '21
Justice Cardozo long ago warned against the danger of
casually using and interchanging such terminology. In
Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co. ,22 Cardozo wrote:
The whole problem of the relation between parent and
subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the
mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the corpo-
rate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation
operates a business through a subsidiary which is charac-
terized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well
enough if the picturesqueness of the epithets does not
lead us to forget that the essential term to be defined is the
act of operation.23
By "operation," Cardozo referred to the parent's domin-
ion and control over its subsidiary,2 4 an issue which to this
day remains critical in deciding whether to pierce the cor-
porate veil.
A. The Instrumentality Rule
In the parent-subsidiary context, the three elements of
the instrumentality rule are: (1) such substantial control
by the parent corporation as to render the subsidiary its
20 Id. § 43.10, at 759; see also Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
21 See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
22 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
23 Id. at 94, 155 N.E. at 61. Berkey was injured when alighting from a streetcar
as a result of the motorman's negligence. She sued the parent corporation which
owned several subsidiary streetcar companies with interconnecting lines in New
York City, including the company that actually operated the streetcar she had rid-
den. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action because
plaintiff failed to prove that the parent exercised dominion over the subsidiary.
Id., 155 N.E. at 61-62.
24 Id.
COMMENTS
mere instrumentality; (2) the parent's commission of
fraud or other wrong, acting through the subsidiary; and
(3) injury or unjust loss to the plaintiff.2 5 A plaintiff must
prove all three elements in order to pierce the subsidi-
ary's corporate veil. The linchpin of the instrumentality
rule is control. In applying the rule, the threshold ques-
tion is whether the parent corporation exercised domin-
ion and control over the subsidiary. 6
Control is the most ambiguous element of the rule be-
cause at least eleven individual factors may be considered
by a court in determining the degree of control exercised
by the parent." These factors are as follows:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capi-
tal stock of the subsidiary.
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have com-
mon directors or officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital
stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its
incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other
expenses or losses of the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except
with the parent corporation or no assets except those con-
veyed to it by the parent corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or in the
statements of its officers, the subsidiary is described as a
department or division of the parent corporation, or its
25 Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160 (7th Cir.
1963); see I W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43.10.
26 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43.10. "Control, not mere majority or com-
plete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy
and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of
its own ...... Id.
27 The courts most frequently derive or quote these factors from a treatise by
Professor Frederick Powell. See F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
8-9 (1931).
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business or financial responsibility is referred to as the
parent corporation's own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the sub-
sidiary as its own.
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not
act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take
their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's
interest.
(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are
not observed.28
If certain of these factors are not present in the proper
combination, the first element of the instrumentality rule
(and thus the whole test) fails. Powell offers some gui-
dance as to the relative importance of his factors in the
discussions following his basic list. The first factor is "es-
sential" to the rule, and the second and third are "impor-
tant." 2 9 But these three factors, without more, are
insufficient grounds to pierce the corporate veil because
they are consistent with "conventional business prac-
tice."' 30 Powell continues:
[W]e approach the danger line when we introduce addi-
tional elements showing a further exercise of control by
the parent corporation .... [A] hard and fast rule cannot
be laid down but, as a rough guide, it may be stated, gen-
erally, that proof of the following additional [factors]
(sometimes one and often two) will be sufficient to hold
the parent corporation [liable]. Some, of course, are more
important than others. 3'
Powell proceeds to analyze each remaining factor, char-
acterizing most as "some evidence," but only two as con-
clusive. The parent's use of the subsidiary's property as
its own is "almost always fatal proof. ' 32 The lack of in-
dependent action by the subsidiary's officers and direc-
20 Id. at 9.
20 Id. at 10-11.
-0 Id. at 12.
, ' Id.
I d. at 17 (factor (i)).
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tors, if directly proven, is "conclusive. '3 3 Unfortunately,
such direct proof is rarely available, so in practice this fac-
tor is not often dispositive.3 4
As this comment will reveal, most courts have chosen to
ignore Powell's guidelines, preferring to cite or merely pi-
rate the basic list of factors and to determine their relative
importance based on the facts of each case. This ad hoc
approach by the courts makes it difficult for either party in
a particular case to predict which and how many of the
control factors the plaintiff must prove in order to satisfy
the first element of the instrumentality rule. If a court
finds that the subsidiary was in fact under the domination
of the parent at the time of the injury or loss, the court
then reaches the comparatively straightforward second
and third elements of the rule.
The second element of the instrumentality rule requires
a claimant to show that the parent, acting through its sub-
sidiary, committed a fraud, breach of duty, or other
wrong.3 5 The term "other wrong" is necessarily broad in
the context of the rule; it is defined by the substance of
the underlying cause of action. Significantly, disregard of
the corporate entity is not an end in itself, but a means to
an end. That one corporation controls another does not
of itself give rise to a cause of action. Rather, the courts
will disregard the corporate entity only when justice re-
quires such a step in order to remedy an actionable
wrong.3 6
The third element of the rule requires the claimant to
show that the parent's fraud, breach, or other wrong, per-
Id. at 18 (factor (j)).
See id.
Steven, 324 F.2d at 160; 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43.10. "Such control
must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate
the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act
in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights .... Id.
,'; United States v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905) "[Wlhen the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation
as an association of persons." Id. at 255; 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41, at
603.
1991] COMMENTS 1141
1142 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
petrated through its subsidiary, proximately caused the
claimant's injury or lossA 7 Reversing the order of the ele-
ments yields a succinct restatement of the instrumentality
rule: the claimant must show actual injury or loss that was
proximately caused by the parent corporation acting
through pervasive control and domination of its subsidi-
ary. When a plaintiff proves all three elements, the court
will disregard the corporate entity of the subsidiary if nec-
essary to prevent the protection of fraud, contravention of
public policy, or other inequitable result.
B. The Alter Ego Theory: Another Misty Metaphor?
The alter ego theory and the instrumentality rule are
functionally interchangeable in that a plaintiff generally
must establish the same three elements in order for a
court to disregard the corporate entity. The principal dis-
tinction is that "alter ego" connotes a natural person or
persons controlling the corporation in question rather
than another corporation.38 In recognition of the fact that
the sole or a few stockholders of a close corporation may
legitimately exercise substantial control over it, courts
sometimes use an alternative approach to the control ele-
ment in alter ego cases. The plaintiff satisfies the control
test in these cases when he can show such substantial
identity of interest that the corporation no longer has a
personality separate from its owners. 9 Powell mentions
this approach as a corollary of his control test for parent-
subsidiary relationships, noting that the difference is
merely one of degree.40
The leading treatise on corporation law illustrates the
interchangeability of the "alter ego" and "instrumental-
ity" labels. In discussing the alter ego theory, Fletcher
first speaks of fastening liability on a person who uses a
17 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43.10; see Steven, 324 F.2d at 160.
." See I W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.10.
' Id. § 41.10, at 615.
4," F. POWELL, supra note 27, at 7-8 (citing United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R.
Co., 220 U.S. 257, 272 (1911)).
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corporation as a mere instrumentality for his personal af-
fairs. 4 1 The same section of the treatise then states that
"[a] corporation may be the alter ego of another corpora-
tion .... Such indiscriminate use of labels and meta-
phors is precisely the object of Justice Cardozo's warning
and other commentators' criticisms.43
Whatever the label used by a particular court, the case
law clearly demonstrates that courts may apply the doc-
trine of disregard of the corporate entity in many substan-
tive areas of law.44 The scope of this comment is limited
to tort, contract, and labor relations cases, most of which
involve the aviation industry.
41 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.10, at 615.
42 Id. § 41.10, at 616.
43 See Note, supra note 10, at 678. The Fifth Circuit recently drew attention to
the confusion in terms related to veil-piercing theories. Lubrizol Corp. v. Cardi-
nal Constr. Co., 868 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1989).
There are many different terms ascribed to a cause of action seeking
to hold one corporation liable for the actions of another corpora-
tion. Common theories use terms and phrases such as "alter ego",
"agency", "mere instrumentality", "sham corporation", and "iden-
tity". Not only are these terms unhelpful, but they cloud the think-
ing of lawyers and judges.
Id. at 769.
44 Plaintiffs have invoked corporate disregard theory as a procedural device in
conjunction with long-arm statutes to assert in personam and subject matter juris-
diction over foreign corporations. See, e.g., Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512
F. Supp. 764 (D. Kan. 1981) (applying alter ego theory to questions of both per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction, where plaintiffs were French citizens, parent
was Connecticut corporation, and subsidiary was Canadian corporation); Taca
Int'l Airlines v. Rolls Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965) (service of process on officer of United States sub-subsidiary
of British corporation was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction where sub-
subsidiary was mere department of foreign parent).
In tax cases, courts generally will not disregard corporate entities when doing
so would allow one corporation to avoid tax liability. See Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. v.
Johnson, 157 Me. 380, 173 A.2d 141 (1961) (printing company liable for use tax
on plates bought in ordinary course of business from wholly-owned subsidiary).
But see Maine Aviation Corp. v.Johnson, 160 Me. 1, 196 A.2d 748 (1964) (general
rule held inapplicable to casual sale of used aircraft by parent to subsidiary, even
though both corporations were aircraft dealers).
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II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN TORT ACTIONS
A. To Fasten Liability on Shareholders
The act of incorporating brings several benefits to an
enterprise. One of the major advantages of the corporate
entity is the limited liability that its shareholders generally
enjoy. Assuming that his or her stock is fully paid in, an
individual stockholder (even a sole shareholder) is not
personally liable for the torts of the corporation. There
are two exceptions to this general rule. One concerns
certain cases involving tortious conduct by the officers
and directors of the corporation;45 the other is the case
where the court will pierce the corporate veil and fasten
liability on individual or corporate stockholders.
As a practical matter, a plaintiff injured by a corporation
will attempt to pierce the corporate veil when the assets of
the corporation are insufficient to compensate his or her
injuries.46 Plaintiffs often employ such a "deep pockets"
strategy in aircraft crash cases. Despite the frequency
with which plaintiffs advance the theory, courts are ex-
pressly reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in any busi-
ness context, including aviation.
A good example of this judicial reluctance is found in
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp. 47 In this wrongful
death action, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for
the death of her husband in the crash of a single-engine
4-1 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 544 (1990). A director, officer, or agent is liable for
his or her own torts, regardless of whether the corporation also is liable. These
persons may also be liable for torts committed by the corporation if they author-
ized, participated or acquiesced in the torts. Id.; see id. § 699; see also 3A W.
FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 1135, 1137 (rev. perm. ed. 1986 & Supp. 1990).
46 Courts frequently use gross undercapitalization as partial justification for
piercing the corporate veil, and Powell characterizes it as "strong proof." F. Pow-
ELL, supra note 27, at 14-15. The seminal case is Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.) (held, unconscionable for common owner of
two corporations to escape liability by tranferring assets of one to undercapital-
ized entity), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 644 (1920). For a modem case in point, see
Trans-Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. K.A. 300 Corp., No. 88-C- 1189 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17,
1989) (1989 WL 27450), discussed infra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
4' 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963).
[56
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airplane in which he was a paying passenger. 48 The facts
of the case are as follows: Turner Aviation Corporation
(TAG) operated charter flights under authority of an air
taxi certificate issued by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.49
Based in Terre Haute, Indiana, TAC was incorporated in
1953 by Roscoe Turner, French Elrod, and Cecil Taylor.
Madonna Turner was secretary-treasurer of TAC. The
Turners and Elrod were also directors or officers of Ros-
coe Turner Aeronautical Corporation (RTAG), an Indian-
apolis-based business incorporated in 1931. RTAC also
held an air taxi operating certificate. Both TAC and
RTAC engaged in sales and service of aircraft in addition
to carrying passengers for hire.50
Richard Meserve, general manager and vice president
of TAC, had standing instructions from Roscoe Turner to
use only aircraft owned by RTAC or TAC for charter op-
erations. TAC owned only one single-engine airplane
and employed only one pilot. Consequently, at Meserve's
request, RTAC would occasionally send additional air-
craft and pilots to TAC in Terre Haute. Meserve was also
an officer and shareholder of Wremco Enterprises, Inc.
(Wremco), together with one Vernon Hux.5 '
On the night of the crash, plaintiff's decedent (Steven)
and others were stranded at Terre Haute by the cancella-
tion of a scheduled airline flight. Steven and five others
contacted TAC to charter a flight to Chicago. 2 Unwilling
to pay for one twin-engine airplane owned by RTAC, plus
the cost of flying that aircraft into Terre Haute from Indi-
anapolis to perform the charter, Steven and the other pas-
sengers agreed to charter two single-engine airplanes
from TAC, each of which carried three passengers. The
airplane which crashed, killing Steven, was rented by TAC
4s Id at 158.
49 Id. TAC's certificate authorized daytime flights only. Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. Steven and the others first requested one airplane capable of carrying all
six of them. Id.
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from Wremco, contrary to Roscoe Turner's instructions."
Plaintiff, Steven's widow and administratrix, sued
RTAC as well as TAC, Wremco, Hux, and Meserve 4
Plaintiff alleged that TAC was the agent or alternatively
the mere instrumentality of RTAC.5 5 The district court
granted RTAC's motion for summary judgment and
plaintiff appealed.56
The question presented to the Seventh Circuit was
whether a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the
evidence of agency or instrumentality offered by plaintiff.
The court quickly resolved the agency issue57 and turned
to the instrumentality rule. Addressing the control ele-
ment of the rule, the court first quoted the eleven factors
enumerated by Powell. 8 Plaintiff's evidence established
(1) that the Turners owned seventy per cent of the stock
of TAC and (2) the "substantial identity of officers and
directors" of TAC and RTAC.5 9 The court found that
these two factors alone were not sufficient to invoke the
instrumentality rule.6 °
Plaintiff also introduced into evidence business records
of RTAC and TAC for the five years preceding the crash.
The court said that these records clearly showed the ab-
sence of many of the other requisite control factors, and
noted further that RTAC itself did not own stock in
TAC.6 1 The Seventh Circuit found that other evidence
'.1 Id. at 158-59. The rented airplane was the sole asset of Wremco. Hux, pilot
of the airplane that crashed, was not licensed to carry passengers. Meserve
piloted the TAC airplane, which landed safely in Chicago. Id. at 158.
54 Id. at 159.
-- Id. at 158.
-6 Id. at 160. RTAC had convinced the district court that there was no question
about its separate corporate identity. Id.
.17 Id. The court disposed of the agency question on the ground that only where
an express agency relationship was shown as between a parent and subsidiary
would the parent's liability become an issue. The court found no evidence of such
a relationship between RTAC and TAC. Id. at 161, 163.
-1 Id. at 161. For a list of the factors, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying
text.
- Steven, 324 F.2d at 161.
-0 Id.
- Id. at 162.
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which the trial court refused to admit would not have
helped plaintiffs case. 62 Having found no issue concern-
ing the applicability of the instrumentality rule, the court
affirmed the summary judgment below.63
The Steven case is still good law in the Seventh Circuit,
and is cited as persuasive authority in seven other circuits.
The citing cases rely on Steven for the list of control fac-
tors, the requirement of showing them in proper combi-
nation, or for the other elements of the instrumentality
rule.64 In 1976, a different panel of the Seventh Circuit
followed the Steven decision in Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v.
United States,65 a case involving the mid-air collision of an
airliner and a small airplane flown by a student pilot.66
62 Id The district court struck an uncertified copy of Roscoe Turner's testi-
mony before the CAB, but later read and considered it. Id. at 161. The testimony
did "not raise a genuine factual issue under the instrumentality rule." It showed
Turner's "sound business practice" of helping Meserve manage TAC. Id. at 162.
6s Id. at 163.
-, See Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d
1053 (9th Cir. 1976) (where multiplicity of control factors were present as be-
tween defendant parent corporation and its subsidiary, trial court erred in not
treating the two as a single entity); Scarborough v. Perez, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 659,
660 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (in action by pension fund trustee against sole share-
holder of parent corporation of insolvent subsidiary to recover unpaid contribu-
tions, court found no allegations of fraud or injustice that would justify piercing
corporate veil (applying Indiana law)); Akzona Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 237 (D. Del. 1984) (service of process on subsidiary "does
not confer jurisdiction over the parent where separate corporate identities are
maintained . . .unless the subsidiary is found to be either the alter ego or the
agent of the parent"); United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085,
1093 (D. Minn. 1982) (quoting list of factors and finding existence of triable issue
of fact as to defendant's "control and dominion" over subsidiary manufacturer of
allegedly hazardous product); D.L. Auld Co. v. Park Electrochemical Corp., 553 F.
Supp. 804, 807 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (in patent infringement action against subsidiary
and parent, court found four specific factors "conspicuously absent" from plain-
tiff's "list" and refused to pierce veil; "[w]hile no one factor or combination of
factors is directly determinative on the question of control, this Court finds that
the elements identified by the plaintiff... are insufficient as a matter of law ....");
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 618
(N.D. Me. 1977) (court refused to pierce corporate veil and compel parent corpo-
ration to enter into arbitration with union under terms of subsidiary's union con-
tact); Bay Sound Transp. Co. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 420, 426 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (principal purpose of separate incorporation of barges and vessels held not
avoidance or evasion of income tax liability).
504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
Id. The other plaintiff in the case was GECC Leasing Corp. (GECC), lessor
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The owner of the small aircraft, a Piper Cherokee, was
Forth Corporation (Forth), which operated a flight school
and sold, rented and serviced airplanes.6 7 Brookside Cor-
poration (Brookside) owned all of the stock in Forth.68
The Cherokee and Allegheny's aircraft, a DC-9-31, were
both destroyed in the collision; no one aboard either air-
plane survived.6 9 Allegheny sued the United States, the
student pilot's estate, Forth, and Brookside to recover
$3,750,000 for the loss of the DC-9. 70 The district court
directed a verdict in favor of defendant Brookside at the
close of plaintiffs' case in chief, and plaintiffs appealed.7 '
The Seventh Circuit quoted Powell's list of factors from
Steven, but found no evidence to support plaintiffs' instru-
mentality theory. 72 Noting that Forth was "a young or-
ganization" when the accident occurred, the court
reasoned that whatever control Brookside exerted over
Forth was justified as a necessary protection of Brook-
side's investment.7 Having rejected plaintiffs' control ar-
gument, the court did not reach the second and third
elements of the instrumentality rule.74 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the directed verdict for Brookside. 5
of one of the engines on the destroyed DC-9. The defendants, in addition to the
United States, were Brookside Corporation (Brookside), Forth Corporation (a
subsidiary of Brookside), and the estate of the student pilot, Robert W. Carey. Id.
at 106.
67 Id. at 107.
- Id at 106.
69 Id. at 108.
70 Id. at 106-07. In addition, GECC sought to recover $250,000 for the engine
it owned which was destroyed in the collision. Id. The trial court dismissed
GECC as a party plaintiff "on the basis that it was not a real party in interest." Id.
at 111. Defendants argued that GECC sustained no loss because Allegheny had
delivered a replacement engine to GECC pursuant to their lease agreement. The
Seventh Circuit held the dismissal was erroneous because the collateral source
rule "provides that compensation for loss which is received by a plaintiff from a
collateral source independent of the wrongdoer cannot be utilized by the wrong-
doer in mitigation of damages." Id. at 112.
7, Id. at 107.
72 Id. at 112-13.
7-1 Id. at 113.
74 Id. at 112.
7.1 Id. at 113. The court reversed and remanded as to the other defendants,
however. Id. at 107.
Allegheny and Steven are similar in at least two aspects
which the court did not address. First, the most obvious
defendant in both cases apparently was not in a financial
position to pay a substantial damage award, if any at all.
The student pilot arguably was the actor who proximately
caused Allegheny's losses,76 but his estate was presumably
inadequate to pay a seven-digit judgment. In Steven, TAC
was responsible for the acts of its employees, but TAC
owned only one aircraft and employed a single pilot,
77
suggesting that its assets might have been insufficient to
satisfy the plaintiff's claim. Most likely, these plaintiffs
were looking to the deep pockets of parent corporations
to assure satisfaction of their judgments. The limited lia-
bility afforded by the corporate entity is one of the major
reasons why businesses incorporate, especially in aviation
where the risks of personal injury and property loss are
inherent and the damages potentially substantial. The
preservation of the limited liability concept is the goal be-
hind the courts' reluctance and cautiousness toward disre-
garding the corporate entity.7 8
The second similarity is that a jury did not decide the
corporate disregard question in either case. Although es-
sentially a question of fact because of the many factors to
be considered, disregard of the corporate entity is an eq-
uitable remedy. Therefore, a plaintiff is not necessarily
entitled to a jury trial on the question.79 In Allegheny, the
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the parent corpo-
ration at the close of plaintiff's case. 80 In Steven, the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for defendant
7s The court rejected as clearly erroneous the district court's findings that Alle-
gheny's flight crew was negligent. Allegheny, 504 F.2d at 110-11.
77 Steven, 324 F.2d at 158.
78 "The corporate form . . . is not lightly disregarded, since limited liability is
one of the principal purposes for which the law has created the corporation."
Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098,
1102 (5th Cir. 1973).
79 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 41, 41.25.
so Allegheny, 504 F.2d at 107. None of the other claims were sent to the jury,
either. Id.
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RTAC.8 ' These cases demonstrate that there may be a
question of fact about corporate disregard issues. Even
where a genuine fact issue exists, however, the facts ad-
duced may be such that no reasonable juror could find for
the plaintiff. Furthermore, if the question is presented to
the jury, the jury's role is merely advisory because of the
equitable nature of the remedy, absent a stipulation by the
parties to abide by the verdict on the issue.82
Another case in which the corporate disregard question
did not go to the jury is In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
International Airport, Denver, Colorado, on November 15, 1987
(hereinafter Stapleton).83 This multidistrict litigation in-
volved numerous personal injury and wrongful death
claims arising out of the crash of a Continental Airlines
jet.84 The federal cases were transferred to the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado, where
the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee selected an exemplar
case and tried it to a jury.85 The original defendants
named were Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental) and
its parent holding company, Texas Air Corporation
(Texas Air).86 Plaintiffs based their claims against Texas
Air on the theory that Continental was a mere instrumen-
tality of Texas Air and therefore Texas Air was liable for
Continental's conduct.8 7  Texas Air moved for a directed
81 Steven, 324 F.2d at 159.
82 See In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo. on Nov. 15, 1987,
720 F. Supp. 1467, 1484 (D. Colo. 1989); 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.25.
720 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Colo. 1989).
I ld. at 1471. The aircraft crashed during takeoff from the Denver airport in a
heavy snowstorm. Ice accumulation on the wings and fuselage was one cause of
the crash, in which 28 persons died and 54 were injured. Id.
d. at 1472-73.
IA d. at 1469.
87 Id. at 1483. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages from both
defendants. The stipulated trial plan called for bifurcation of the damages issues.
In Phase I, the jury would decide under Colorado law whether defendants were
liable for compensatory damages and, under Texas law, whether defendants were
liable for punitive damages. The jury was instructed to award compensatory dam-
ages, if any, in the exemplar case, according to Idaho law (domicile of the exem-
plar trial plaintiffs). The remaining cases would then be transferred back to the
respective plaintiffs' home states for determination of their compensatory damage
awards. The exemplar trial did not reach Phase II, determination of the total
verdict, and the court dismissed the claims against it at the
close of plaintiffs' case.88 The jury ultimately awarded
compensatory damages to the plaintiffs based on Conti-
nental's negligence. In answer to a separate special inter-
rogatory, the jury found that Continental was not grossly
negligent under Texas law and hence no punitive dam-
ages were justified. 9
After the court discharged the jury, plaintiffs moved for
amended judgment or a new trial on several grounds. 90 In
particular, plaintiffs asserted that the dismissal of their
claims against Texas Air had prejudiced their ability to
prove the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. 9 1
Because the jury had found no liability for punitive dam-
ages, the court held that the measure of punitive damages
was "not truly in issue. "92
The court also found that, despite several opportunities
to respond to Texas Air's motion for directed verdict,
plaintiffs had failed to establish at trial that Texas Air's
control of Continental caused plaintiffs' injuries.9 3 Con-
cerning the "factual predicate" for disregard of the corpo-
rate entity, the court cited a Tenth Circuit opinion
enumerating eleven "factors to be considered" under the
instrumentality rule.94 In addition to proving a parent
corporation's dominance of its subsidiary, the court stated
that a plaintiff must show that recognition of the subsidi-
ary's separate corporate form would promote injustice, il-
amount of punitive damages, because the jury found no liability therefor during
Phase I. Id. at 1472-74.
m Id. at 1474.
89 Id.
9 Id. at 1470. In addition to alleging that the dismissal of Texas Air was erro-
neous, plaintiffs alleged inconsistencies in the jury's answers to special interroga-
tories, and "errors in the application of the stipulated trial plan [which]
prejudiced presentation of claims for punitive damages .... Id.
91 Id. at 1483.
92 Id.
9- Id. at 1484.
- Id. (citing Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 & n.4
(10th Cir. 1980)). In Luckett, the court listed 11 factors to be considered which are
similar to Powell's factors. See F. POWELL, supra note 27, at 9.
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legality, or fraud.95 Not only did the plaintiffs in Stapleton
fail to show such injustice, they also failed to show that the
court's refusal to pierce the corporate veil adversely af-
fected their ability to recover damages from
Continental.96
The plaintiffs in Stapleton sought to maximize their re-
covery by piercing a subsidiary's corporate veil to recover
punitive damages from its parent. Under Texas law, a
plaintiff can introduce evidence of a defendant's wealth as
a factor in measuring punitive damages.97 By dismissing
the claims against Texas Air, plaintiffs argued, the court
closed the door to plaintiffs' reliance on Texas Air's
wealth as a basis for measuring punitive damages. The
issue is likely to arise again, however, in future multidis-
trict litigation of aviation disasters.
B. The "Reverse Pierce" to Avoid Liability
Just as courts are reluctant to disregard the corporate
entity to impose liability on shareholders, so they are cau-
tious where the disregard theory would allow a corpora-
tion to escape liability for its conduct. For example,
consider a parent corporation which is immune from com-
mon-law tort liability to its employees under workers'
compensation statutes. A subsidiary of that corporation
which is otherwise liable to the parent's employees will
not be allowed to pierce the corporate veil "in reverse" to
enjoy the parent's immunity.98 This principle is illus-
trated in another air crash case, Gregory v. Garrett Corp.99
Plaintiff, whose husband died with seven others in the
crash of the private jet he piloted, sued the aircraft manu-
facturer and other corporations connected with certain
9- Stapleton, 720 F. Supp. at 1484.
Id. The Stapleton court also noted that a court normally has the discretion to
treat as advisory a jury verdict on the issue of disregarding the corporate entity.
Id.
1.7 Id. at 1483.
" 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43.80, at 789; see id. § 41.70.
i" 578 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter Gregory I].
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critical components alleged to have caused the crash.100
Plaintiff's decedent and his copilot were employees of
TexasGulf Aviation, Inc. (TGA), a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of TexasGulf, Inc. (TexasGulf).' 0 The six passengers
all were employees of TexasGulf; four were residents of
Connecticut, TexasGulf's principal place of business, and
two resided in North Carolina, where TexasGulf also
maintained an office.102 All eight decedents' salaries had
been paid by TexasGulf, and all were covered by a work-
ers' compensation insurance policy issued to Texas-
Gulf.'0 3 Before filing the instant suit, the survivors of the
crash victims accepted payment of benefits authorized
under the respective state workers' compensation acts."°
The survivors soon realized that the statutory compen-
sation to which they were entitled was meager at best
compared with the decedents' salaries. 10 5  In the
meantime, TexasGulf and TGA had sued the aircraft man-
ufacturer and other corporations connected with the gen-
erator control units (GCUs)-components which
allegedly caused the crash-for loss of the aircraft.'0 6 The
survivors filed actions against the same defendants, seek-
ing wrongful death compensation. 0 7 Garrett Corpora-
tion (Garrett) and the other component-connected
'- Id. at 876. Defendants were Lockheed Corporation, the aircraft manufac-
turer; Phoenix Aerospace, Inc., manufacturer of the generator control units
(GCUs) aboard the aircraft, which allegedly failed; Colt Electronics Co., Inc.,
which modified and sold the GCUs to TGA; The Garrett Corporation, which in-
stalled the GCUs in the aircraft; and the United States. The government was
named because the FAA had approved the modification and installation of the
GCUs, and because it was responsible for the air traffic controllers involved with
the fatal flight. Id.
,o, Id. at 875. J. Morgan Gregory was president and director of TGA and was in
command of the aircraft; his copilot, Shanley Sorenson, was listed as "Pilot for
TGA." Id.; TexasGulf, Inc. v. Colt Elecs. Co., 615 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
102 Gregoty I, 578 F. Supp. at 875.
01 lId at 876.
" Id.
105 Id.
o6 Id. TexasGulf and TGA had filed suit in the same district court nine months
after the crash. Id.; see TexasGulfv. Colt, 615 F. Supp. at 650. For a list of the
defendant corporations, see supra note 100.
10, Gregoty 1, 578 F. Supp. at 876.
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defendants impleaded TexasGulf and TGA, alleging that
employees of the latter two companies who serviced the
aircraft negligently caused the crash.'0 8 Garrett and the
others sought contribution from TexasGulf and TGA to
the extent of their liability, if any.'0 9
The basic question presented to the court in Gregory I
was whether the statutory immunity of a parent corpora-
tion under the exclusive remedy provisions of applicable
workers' compensation acts extended to a subsidiary of
the parent."10 The question was presented on two alter-
native theories, one of which was the alter ego theory."'~
Moreover, the court had to answer the question in the
context of a third-party contribution claim as well as the
direct claims of four other survivors." 2 The court first de-
cided that New York law, which allows third-party contri-
bution claims in workers' compensation cases, applied to
the third-party claims.' 13
The court then addressed TGA's claim that it was the
alter ego of TexasGulf and, therefore, as immune from
liability as TexasGulf."I4 The court cited a long list of au-
thorities showing the reluctance of courts to indulge the
alter ego argument, and summed up in one simple propo-
sition: "[O]ne who has gained the advantages of separate
incorporation must also be willing to accept the conse-
I- Id. Survivors of four of the passengers sued TGA directly, on the theory that
TGA was not protected by TexasGulf's immunity. Id. at 877.
109 Id.
1i0 Id.
II Id. The alternative theory asserted as a defense by TexasGulf and TGA was
that all of the decedents as well as the aircraft maintenance personnel were co-
employees of TexasGulf; therefore, the immunity of TexasGulf under applicable
workers' compensation law extended to the TGA "employees." Id.
112 Id. The court entered into an elaborate analysis of third-party claims in
workers' compensation cases generally, and a discussion of the conflict of laws
question in the instant case, which involved Connecticut, North Carolina, and
New York law. Id. at 877-84.
, Id. at 884. The court found that the law of Connecticut and North Carolina
applied to the four direct claims against TGA. Id. at 886.
,14 Id. "Whether one looks at this contention as an effort to pierce the corpo-
rate veil or as an argument that the parent and subsidiary were actually so inter-
twined as to be a single entity, it represents a legal theory that has not met with a
warm reception in the courts of most states .... Id.
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quences of such incorporation."'"1 5 Acknowledging the
familiar provisions for employer and co-employee immu-
nity in most workers' compensation acts, the court em-
phasized the other "strong policy" of such acts:
"preserving the employee's rights to bring tort claims
against. . . 'strangers' to the employment relationship."" 1 6
In other words, even if a parent and a subsidiary were
shown to be "so intertwined as to be a single entity,"' 7
public policy would be contravened if the limited statu-
tory immunity of an employer could be expanded to pro-
tect the employer's parent or subsidiary.
The court in Gregory I ultimately denied TexasGulf's
and TGA's motion for summary judgment on all of the
claims, both third-party and direct, on the ground that
there were questions of material fact to be decided by a
jury."' The two corporations subsequently moved for a
bifurcated trial, asking the court to try their affirmative de-
fenses first, before the issues of liability and damages.' ' 9
The court granted this motion and conducted a jury trial
of TexasGulf's and TGA's defenses of immunity under
workers' compensation laws in April 1984.120 The jury
found that TGA was not the alter ego of TexasGulf for
workers' compensation purposes, that the employer of the
11. Id. The court cited, inter alia, Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d
655, 662 (6th Cir.) (parent corporation of mine operator not immune from liabil-
ity for deaths of 15 miners under workers' compensation act), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
836 (1979); Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 327 (C.D.
Cal. 1980) (subsidiary corporations not immune under workers' compensation act
from third-party actions by survivors of employees of parent corporation killed in
airplane crash), remanded on other grounds sub noam. Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought,
Inc., 711 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983); Samaras v. GATX Leasing Corp., 75 A.D.2d
890, 428 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (1980) (parent corporation not employer of injured em-
ployee of subsidiary and therefore not immune from strict product liability action
under workers' compensation act); Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 5 N.C. App. 150,
167 S.E.2d 817, 819-20 (1969) (held, employer's immunity does not extend to its
parent corporation, but duty of care of parent towards plaintiff was not shown on
the facts). Id.
I Gregory 1, 578 F. Supp. at 887.
1,7 Id. at 886; see supra note 114.
- Gregory 1, 578 F. Supp. at 889.
Ili) Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 589 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter
Gregory II].
120 Id. at 298.
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airplane's flight crew' 2' and maintenance personnel was
TGA, and that TGA was the operator of the aircraft. 2 2
The Gregory cases present a policy question of particular
interest to the aviation community. The question is
whether the citizenship requirements imposed by the FAA
on aircraft owners 23 place an unreasonable burden on
corporations like TexasGulf by indirectly exposing them
to tort liability from which they are directly immune.
Briefly, to fulfill FAA registration requirements for an air-
craft based in the United States, the corporation which
owns it must meet strict criteria: (1) the president and at
least two-thirds of the directors and officers must be
United States citizens, and (2) United States citizens must
hold seventy-five percent or more of the voting interest in
the corporation. 24 In other words, regardless of nominal
12, The widows of the pilot and copilot later settled their claims. TexasGulf v.
Colt, 615 F. Supp. at 650 n.l; see supra note 101.
122 Gregory H, 589 F. Supp. at 298. The issues were presented to the jury in the
form of special interrogatories.
Q. I. Do you find: that at the time of the crash [TGA] functioned
solely as the aviation department of Texasgulf; that Texasgulf and
[TGA] were so merged that they were really only one entity; that
[TGA] had no purpose other than to carry out Texasgulf's business;
and that [TGA]'s corporate structure and any right it had to control
the flight crews and maintenance personnel were so merged with
those of Texasgulf that for purposes of determining the scope of
workers' compensation immunity [TGA] should be considered the
alter ego of Texasgulf rather than a separate corporate entity?
A. No.
Id. (emphasis in original).
123 Section 501 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401 (b)
(1988) provides, in pertinent part:
An aircraft shall be eligible for registration if, but only if-
(1)(A) it is -
(i) owned by a citizen of the United States ... ; or
(ii) owned by a corporation (other than a corporation
which is a citizen of the United States) lawfully organized
and doing business under the laws of the United States or
any State thereof so long as such aircraft is based and pri-
marily used in the United States ....
Id.
124 14 C.F.R. § 47.2 (1991) defines "U.S. citizen" for purposes of aircraft regis-
tration as follows:
(1) An individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its
possessions.
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ownership, United States citizens must have actual control
of the corporation. The judge in Gregory I acknowledged
the existence of this policy question in analyzing the facts
adduced by TGA in support of summary judgment. 2 5
The judge noted that TGA had been a department of
TexasGulf before the crash, and was at the time of the
hearing again a mere department. 2 6 But for the FAA citi-
zenship requirements, the judge observed, TGA probably
would not have been a separate corporation at the time of
the crash. 27 The judge found the facts concerning TGA's
corporate identity "rather more compelling" than in the
usual case of this sort.2 8 The jury in the subsequent trial
obviously did not share the judge's point of view.' 2 9
It is beyond the scope of this comment to balance the
FAA's citizenship requirements against the seemingly ar-
bitrary imposition of liability on some corporate aircraft
owners. The public policy goals underlying the citizen-
ship rules may outweigh the risks forced upon corpora-
tions having foreign stockholders, assuming those policy
goals are still valid. 3 0 Nevertheless, after a decade when
foreign investment in United States corporations became
increasingly common, the liability question is one that re-
(2) A partnership of which each member is such an individual.
(3) A corporation or association created or organized under the laws
of the United States or of any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, of which the president and two-thirds or more of the
board of directors and other managing officers thereof are such indi-
viduals and in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is
owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States
or one of its possessions.
Id.
123 Gregoty I, 578 F. Supp. at 885.
126 Id. "[Ilt appears that TGA transported primarily, if not solely, [TexasGulf]
employees on official [TexasGulfl business." Id.
,27 Id On the other hand, the judge also described the FAA statute and regula-
tions as "a consideration extraneous to this case." Id.
128 Id.
"- Gregoy II, 589 F. Supp. at 298. For a discussion of the jury's verdict in
Gregory II, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
- For a thorough analysis of the FAA citizenship rules and underlying policies,
see Stewart, United States Citizenship Requirements of the Federal Aviation Act - A Misty
Moor of Legalsms or the Rampart of Protectionism?, 55J. AIR L. & CoM. 685 (1990).
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quires careful consideration by corporations which oper-
ate their own aircraft.
III. DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENT=rv IN CONTRACT
ACTIONS
As a general rule, courts are even less likely to disre-
gard the corporate entity in contract cases than in tort ac-
tions.13 ' The reason is simple: in the contract setting, the
injured party chose the entity with whom he dealt; in a
tort case, the relationship of tortfeasor to injured party
generally occurs fortuitously. 3 2 The Fifth Circuit, sitting
en banc, explained the distinction between tort and con-
tract claims in a contract action tried under Texas law.1
3 3
Citing a line of Texas Supreme Court decisions, the Fifth
Circuit observed that a contract case "presents added dif-
ficulties," such as showing why the aggrieved party to a
contract with a corporate subsidiary "should be allowed
to look to the parent. As a matter of contract right it is
evident he may not. '' 4 The Fifth Circuit then compared
the case with a Texas Supreme Court opinion in a tort
claim:
Unlike a suit for breach of contract, the plaintiff in a tort
case does not have the burden of justifying a recovery
against the parent when he willingly contracted with the
subsidiary. The problem in such a case is essentially one
of allocating the loss. It is not necessary to establish
fraud, and the financial strength or weaknesses of the sub-
sidiary is [sic] an important consideration. 3 5
This rationale is consistent with the principle stated in
Gregory I that one who chooses to enjoy the advantages of
separate incorporation also must accept the
, W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.85.
132 1d.
1-, Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
1- Id. at 981 (quoting Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d
336, 339-40 (Tex. 1968)); cf. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.
1986), discussed infra notes 237-249 and accompanying text.
,,,, Edwards Co., 730 F.2d at 982 (quoting Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528
S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975)).
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disadvantages. 1 3 6
A. Alter Ego and Individual Shareholders
The situation where compliance with federal aviation
law necessitates the formation of a separate entity, previ-
ously discussed in a tort context, has also surfaced in a
contract case.1 3 7 In a state court action to recover on a
debt, Hilzendager v. Skwarok,' 3 8 an individual creditor sued
the common officers and directors of two related corpora-
tions, as well as the corporations themselves.' 3 9 The fac-
tual history of the action began in 1967 with the
formation of Holiday Air of America, Inc. (Holiday Air), a
North Dakota corporation whose purpose was "to provide
travel opportunities to qualified individuals."'' 40  Appar-
ently, the corporation was organized to operate an air
travel club as defined in Part 123 of the federal aviation
regulations then in effect.' 4' While the court never used
the term "air travel club," the inference is supported by
repeated references in the opinion to an "FAA 123 Certif-
icate" ' 42 and a quotation from the trial court opinion re-
ferring to "members."'' 43
Summarizing the trial court's findings, the court noted
that under federal regulations, Holiday Air could not own
both the "FAA 123 Certificate" and the requisite air-
plane. 144 The original directors and incorporators of Hol-
iday Air therefore organized Holiday Leasing and
- Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a discus-
sion of the principle as applied in Gregory 1, see supra note 115 and accompanying
text.
17 For a discussion of FAA citizenship requirements, see supra notes 123-130
and accompanying text. For a case in which corporate liability arose out of the
citizenship requirements, see supra notes 99-122.
335 N.W.2d 768 (N.D. 1983).
Id. at 772.
140 Id. at 769.
141 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 123 (1971) (removed, effectiveJan. 1, 1983).
14 Hilzendager, 335 N.W.2d at 770-71.
14-1 Id. at 770. "[Tlhe corporation could produce no income without members,
there could be no members without a 123 certificate utilization, and there could
be no certificate utilization until the plane was operational." Id.
144 Id The court did not substantiate this finding, and Part 123, then in effect,
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Investment, Inc. (Holiday Leasing) as a separate entity to
own and operate an airplane which it would lease to Holi-
day Air. t45 Under the pre-incorporation agreement for
Holiday Leasing, six subscribers were to pay $28,000 each
into the new corporation. The subscribers never paid the
recited consideration, although the stock transfer ledger
showed that they did.' 46 The stated capital of Holiday
Leasing, nevertheless, was $200,000, substantially more
than the sum purportedly paid in by the subscribers. 47
Holiday Leasing encountered financial difficulties from
the outset, arising in part from substantial expenses in-
curred in refurbishing the airplane it had purchased. Two
of the directors actually paid most of these expenses. The
corporation then began seeking loans from other individ-
uals. Plaintiff, John Hilzendager, loaned $36,000 to Holi-
day Leasing, secured by a three-year debenture bond. 48
The record is replete with evidence of commingling of
the funds of the two corporations and of failure to ob-
serve corporate formalities.' 49 Defendant Skwarok, with
knowledge and consent of the other directors, obtained
title to the airplane (the only significant asset of Holiday
is silent on the issue. Presumably, the citizenship requirements discussed above
were a factor. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
I4., d  "Holiday Leasing was to own 80 percent of Holiday Air. The corporate
record book for Holiday Air, however, has since disappeared." Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. The debenture provided that Hilzendager was to be a preferred creditor
over the corporation's stockholders and general creditors. The debenture was
subordinate "only to lending institutions as creditors." Id.
9 Id. at 774.
The corporate minute books of both corporations were not kept cur-
rent. Many of the corporate records have disappeared .... [Sleveral
of the defendants were unaware of and unconcerned about their var-
ious duties as directors and officers. Funds and assets of both corpo-
rations were commingled and disbursed haphazardly. The directors
of Holiday Leasing allowed the conveyance of its sole significant as-
set, the airplane, to Skwarok . . . . [Tihe ultimate fraud occurred
when Skwarok sold the airplane to the college and the other officers
and directors failed to take any action to recover the asset or make
other provisions for Hilzendager's matured claim. These examples
are not an exhaustive recitation of the improprieties which occurred.
Id. at 774-75.
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Leasing) and control of both corporate checkbooks.15 0
Six months after Hilzendager's debenture became due,
Skwarok sold the airplane. The other directors made no
effort to prevent the sale or to recover the airplane.
Hilzendager brought suit to collect his loan. Although
he originally named only Skwarok as defendant, he later
amended his complaint to join the other directors and
both corporations.'15  The amended complaint alleged
commingling and wasting of corporate assets to the detri-
ment of creditors, and a deliberate intent to defraud cred-
itors through the conveyance of the airplane to
Skwarok. 5 2 The trial court found that the directors had
defrauded Hilzendager.53 Curiously, the trial court re-
fused to pierce the corporate veil and hold the individual
defendants directly liable to Hilzendager, concluding:
"There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever believed he
was dealing with the individual defendants in their indi-
vidual capacity [sic] and not as representatives of either
corporation."'' 54 Rather, the trial court held the directors
jointly and severally liable to the corporations for the
principal and interest on the note, and in turn held the
corporations liable to Hilzendager. 55
When the individual defendants appealed, the supreme
court held that the trial court had erred in its circuitous
findings as to liability.' 56 In addition, the court agreed
with Hilzendager that the facts justified disregarding the
-' Id. at 770-71. Skwarok contracted with the two corporations to acquire the
airplane subject to three conditions: (1) he would personally refinance the air-
plane; (2) he would lease it to Holiday Air "to keep the 'FAA 123 Certificate'
valid"; and (3) Holiday Leasing would be able to buy back the airplane. Id. at
771.
151 Id. at 772.
152 Id. The case was tried to the court without a jury. Id.
153 Id.
Id. (quoting trial court's conclusions of law).
15 Id. at 772-73.
- Id. at 773-74. The court held that the trial court erred in awarding judgment
in favor of Holiday Air and Holiday Leasing against the individual defendants,
because neither corporation sued the individuals nor made an appearance in the
case. Id.
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corporate entity. 57 Noting that there are other grounds
for piercing the corporate veil besides the one stated by
the trial court, the court cited one of its earlier deci-
sions,' 58 and a list of significant factors set forth in a Min-
nesota decision. 59 The North Dakota Supreme Court
found so many instances of corporate improprieties that
its list admittedly was not exhaustive. 60 The court found
that the conduct of Skwarok and the other directors was
fraudulent as to Hilzendager, and concluded that "to al-
low the individual defendants to escape liability because
they were doing business under a corporate form would
result in allowing them an advantage they do not
deserve."' 16 '
A more recent case in which a court disregarded the
corporate entity concerns a breach of contract for the sale
of an airplane. In Trans-Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. K.A. 300
Corp., '162 Dr. Leroy A. Pesch, sole stockholder of K.A. 300
Corporation (K.A. 300), was joined as a defendant by
plaintiffs who sought to pierce the corporate veil of K.A.
157 Id. at 774. The trial court had declined to pierce the corporate veil on the
basis of a 1932 decision in which the supreme court applied agency law to the
question of a corporate officer's liability. Id. n.4 (citing Gray v. Edler, 61 N.D.
672, 240 N.W. 477 (1932)).
'-" Id. at 774. "[B]ut, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons." Id. (quoting Schriock v. Schriock, 128
N.W.2d 852, 856 (N.D. 1964) (citation omitted)).
151, Id. The court stated:
It has also been held that factors considered significant in determin-
ing whether or not to disregard the corporate entity include: insuffi-
cient capitalization for the purposes of the corporate undertaking,
failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends,
insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time of the transaction in
question, siphoning of funds by the dominant shareholder, nonfunc-
tioning of other officers and directors, absence of corporate records,
and the existence of the corporation as merely a facade for individ-
ual dealings.
Id. (citing Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512
(Minn. 1979)).
1"' Id. at 774-75. For the court's list of improprieties, see supra note 149.
16, Id. at 775.
,62 No. 88-C-1189 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1989) (1989 WL 27450) [Pinpoint cita-
tions to this case, infra notes 163-170 & 210, refer to Westlaw pagination].
300.163 Plaintiff Trans-Aircraft Sales, Inc. (Trans-Air) ac-
ted as agent for plaintiff Proctor & Gamble, Inc. (P&G) in
negotiating the purchase of an airplane from K.A. 300.
Pesch was the sole shareholder of both K.A. 300 and Avro
Aviation Corporation (Avro). Pesch originally purchased
the airplane from Beech Acceptance Corporation (Beech),
and later transferred title in the airplane to K.A. 300.
Pesch personally guaranteed his note to Beech when he
purchased the airplane; he also pledged the aircraft itself
as security both for the purchase price and for other pre-
existing debts that Pesch owed Beech. K.A. 300 became a
co-obligor on the note as consideration for the title trans-
fer. K.A. 300 thereafter leased the airplane to Avro under
a written lease providing a minimum monthly rent and re-
quiring Avro to insure the airplane.'t 4
Trans-Air offered to purchase the airplane from K.A.
300 on behalf of P&G. K.A. 300 accepted the offer, a
sales agreement was signed, and Trans-Air paid K.A. 300
a "non-refundable deposit" of $25,000 pursuant to the
agreement. While the airplane was being modified to suit
P&G, Beech seized and sold it to satisfy its lien. Trans-Air
and P&G won a default judgment against K.A. 300 in
April 1988 for breach of contract. Plaintiffs then sought
to reach Pesch by disregarding the corporate form of K.A.
300, which was insolvent. 65
The court examined a number of facts in reaching its
decision: (1) Pesch was the sole shareholder of both K.A.
300 and Avro; (2) K.A. 300 did nothing to enforce the
aircraft lease agreement with Avro when Avro stopped
paying rent; (3) rather than enforcing the insurance re-
quirement in the lease, K.A. 300 bought insurance on the
airplane; and (4) the insurance policy and all other opera-
tions of K.A. 300 were funded with loans Pesch made to
the corporation. 66 The court concluded from this evi-
'6S Id.
" Id. at 2.
16 Id at 3-5.
Id "Pesch treated the assets and business of K.A. 300 as his own.... Pesch
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dence that the inaction of K.A. 300 was the result of
Pesch's personal desire to keep Avro profitable. 67 More-
over, the court found that K.A. 300 was grossly under-
capitalized for its intended business purpose, and that
Pesch had intermingled his personal affairs with the busi-
ness of K.A. 300 by pledging the airplane to Beech as se-
curity not only for the purchase price but also for his pre-
existing obligations. 168 In light of all the facts, the court
concluded that recognition of K.A. 300 as a separate cor-
porate entity would "promote injustice or inequitable
consequences."'' 69 Therefore the court pierced the cor-
porate veil and granted plaintiffs' summary judgment mo-
tion, holding Pesch personally liable for damages. 7 0
Other courts faced with actions on breach of contract to
purchase an airplane have refused to pierce the corporate
veil. A comparison of these cases to Trans-Aircraft Sales
reveals factual distinctions, but, more importantly, it
reveals varying interpretations of the standards for invok-
ing the veil-piercing remedy. In Transportes Aereos de Angola
v. Ronair, Inc. ,17 1 a foreign state-owned corporation sued
two United States corporations and the sole director of
one of them. 72 Addressing the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment against the director, Winfield, the court
stated that "courts will not entirely disregard the corporate
form," and that if they do the circumstances must be spe-
operated Avro and K.A. 300 as a single entity with funds from his personal ac-
counts and lines of credit.... Pesch allocated a substantial portion of plaintiffs'
$25,000 deposit to his other companies and to his son." Id, at 6-7.
167 Id. at 6.
- Id. at 8-9. The initial capitalization of K.A. 300 was $1,000, the statutory
minimum. The airplane at issue was the corporation's sole asset. The "cross-
collateralization and Pesch's failure to satisfy his personal debts to Beech
prompted Beech to seize the airplane, causing K.A. 300 to breach its contract with
Trans-Aircraft and Proctor & Gamble." Id. at 7-8.
1- Id. at 9.
170 Id. at 13.
, 693 F. Supp. 102 (D. Del. 1988).
172 Id. at 103. Named defendants were Ronair, Inc. (Ronair), Jet Traders In-
vestment Corp. d/b/a Commercial Air Transport Sales (Jet Traders), and Nigel
Winfield. Id. at 102.
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cific and unusual. 7 3 The court then quoted the familiar
litany supporting disregard of the corporate entity: "to
'prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice, or when recognition
of the corporate entity would defeat public policy
. . . .,,t4 The plaintiff, Transportes Aereos de Angola
(TAAG), alleged that Winfield used Jet Traders as a con-
duit for his personal business and to perpetrate a fraud. 75
In support of these allegations, TAAG introduced two
corporate documents ofJet Traders. Neither of the docu-
ments persuaded the court to find Winfield personally lia-
ble. 7 6 The court denied plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment.' 77
An appellate court in Florida reversed a trial court deci-
sion to the extent that it pierced the corporate veil of an
aircraft dealership, but not without dissent. Charter Air
Center, Inc. v. Miller 78 was an appeal from a breach of con-
tract action brought by Dr. Fred Miller to recover the
$11,000 deposit he had paid on a contract to purchase a
Piper airplane from Charter Air Center, Inc. (Charter
Air).' 79 The jury found both Charter Air and its presi-
dent, Cousins, liable to Miller and awarded compensatory
and punitive damages.180 On appeal, the court found that
Cousins was not involved in any dealings with Miller, nor
did he sign any papers relating to the transaction.' 8 ' Fur-
thermore, the court found that Miller failed to allege and
173 Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (citing Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362
(1944); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967)).
174 Id. (quoting Zubik, 384 F.2d at 272); cf. United States v. Milwaukee Refrig.
Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905) (stating general rule for disre-
garding corporate entity).
15 Ronair, 693 F. Supp. at 111.
' Id. at 111-12. The first document was a memorandum agreement signed by
Winfield and the only other officer of Jet Traders. It provided that Winfield ac-
cepted sole responsibility for disposing of the proceeds of the breached contract.
The second document, a corporate resolution of Jet Traders, provided that all
profits and losses on the contract were to be Winfield's alone. The court found
these factors inadequate to establish domination of Jet Traders by Winfield. Id.
177 Id. at 112.
178 348 So.2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
17. Id. at 615.
"'0 Id.
i" Id. at 617.
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prove that Charter Air was the alter ego of Cousins or that
the corporation was used for fraudulent purposes.'82
The dissenting opinion in Charter Air supported the
jury's findings concerning both compensatory and puni-
tive damages.' 83 The dissenting judge emphasized Char-
ter Air's misrepresentation to Miller (made at Cousins'
instance) that it was an authorized Piper dealership.' 84
The judge also noted additional evidence which sup-
ported an inference of intentional fraud, including bank
records of Charter Air and testimony of the airplane sales-
man concerning Cousins. 8 5
B. "Reverse" Disregard Revisited
In Hilzendager, individual shareholders were held per-
sonally liable on a corporate debt through disregard of
the corporate entity.'8 6 In contrast, if the debt is a per-
sonal obligation of an individual shareholder who uses the
corporation to secrete assets in order to avoid personal
liability, the corporation may be held liable.8 7 The court
will pierce the corporate veil and hold the corporation lia-
ble on the debt when the creditor can prove that control-
ling shareholders "used the corporation to deceive or
defraud personal creditors."' 881 This remedy is known as
"reverse disregard" because, instead of holding share-
holders liable for ostensibly corporate acts or obligations,
the purpose is to hold the corporation liable for the acts
or obligations of a shareholder.'8 9
In Lambert v. Farmers Bank,' 90 William Lambert bor-
182 Id.
-3 Id. "[It could be inferred that [Charter Air] made false representations to
obtain Dr. Miller's deposit which could be used to pay other bills, rather than to
furnish the airplane." Id. (Grimes, J. dissenting).
I " Id.
185 Id.
186 Hilzendager v. Skwarok, 335 N.W.2d 768 (N.D. 1983). For a discussion of
the case, see supra notes 138-161 and accompanying text.
187 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.70.
18,Id.
189 Id.
1- 519 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
rowed $20,000 from Farmers Bank on a promissory note
which Lambert signed individually and in his capacity as
president of Agricultural Aerial Applicators, Inc. (AAA).
To obtain credit from the bank, Lambert represented that
he owned and controlled another corporation, Lambert
Enterprises, Inc. When Lambert defaulted on the loan,
the bank successfully sued Lambert and AAA.' 9' When
the bank attempted to execute the judgment, however,
the sheriff discovered that Lambert's purported assets
were not held in his name. The bank then filed a motion
alleging that Lambert had manipulated "several corporate
entities" to defraud creditors. The trial court found that
Lambert Enterprises, Inc., was the alter ego of Lambert
and that its assets were actually Lambert's personal as-
sets.' 92 Therefore, the "corporate" assets were subject to
execution to satisfy Lambert's personal debt.9'9
On appeal, the court noted that the corporate form may
be disregarded where an individual has used it fraudu-
lently as a shield from liability to third parties.' 94 Despite
Lambert's testimony to the contrary, the court found that
Lambert was the sole shareholder of Lambert Enterprises,
Inc., when the loan in question was made, and that he ex-
ercised complete control over the corporation. 95 The
court held that the trial court properly disregarded the
corporate entity. 96
C. Personal Liability of Promoters of Corporations
Before a corporation actually becomes a legal entity
separate from the persons who form it, a promoter often
19, Id. at 746.
1- Id. at 746-47.
1. id. at 747.
'- Id. "As a general rule, Indiana courts are reluctant to disregard corporate
identity .... " Id.
19 Id. at 748. Lambert's testimony was inconsistent with the business records
of Lambert Enterprises, Inc. "The evidence tended to show that Lambert owned
all the corporate stock, treated corporate assets as his own, used the corporation
to procure goods and services for himself, and that he generally governed all the
corporate affairs." Id.
1- id. at 748-49.
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enters into contracts on behalf of the future corporation.
The promoter may make agreements to incorporate or to
obtain financing for the nascent entity.1 97 The personal
liability of a promoter on such contracts is a matter of
concern for any person in the process of forming a corpo-
ration. Depending upon the facts, promoters may be per-
sonally liable under established agency law.'98  The
common law and the corporation codes of some states ad-
dress the issue.199
At least one court has invoked the alter ego doctrine in
holding a promoter individually liable on contracts he
signed prior to the formation of the corporation to be
bound. Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie200 was an action for
breach of contract, fraud and conversion by a promoter.
Plaintiff Doyn Aircraft, Inc. (Doyn) entered into a contract
with defendant James Wylie to make Wylie's as-yet-un-
formed corporation the exclusive distributor for Doyn's
airplane conversion kits. Doyn held seventeen FAA sup-
plemental type certificates (STCs) in connection with its
business of manufacturing the kits. 20 ' To finance the ven-
ture, Wylie agreed to lend $25,000 to Doyn. Wylie took
the STCs as security for the proposed loan. He re-regis-
tered the STCs in his name, but refused to fund the loan
or perform the contract. Wylie kept the STCs as "secur-
ity" for a pre-existing debt that Doyn owed him, and then
permitted his new corporation, Atlas Aviation Sales, Inc.
(Atlas) to make conversion kits pursuant to the STCs 2
197 See 18 CJ.S. Corporations §§ 67, 68, 76 (1990); IA W. FLETCHER, supra note 1,
§ 204 (rev. perm. ed. 1983); BALLANTINE, supra note 16, § 35.
- An agent cannot bind a non-existent principal and so is liable unless the
agent's contract is later ratified by the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 82, 326 (1958).
- See, e.g., Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 107 (1983) (promoters' rights and liabilities addressed in com-
ments to § 107); see also REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.04 (1984).
2- 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971).
' Id. at 580. "STCs are issued by the Federal Aviation Administration for the
purpose of allowing modification work to aircraft." Id. at 580 n. 1; see also 49
U.S.C. app. § 1423 (1988) (authorizing FAA to issue aircraft certificates); 14
C.F.R. § 21.111-21.119 (1991) (procedural requirements for STCs).
• Doyn Aircraft, 443 F.2d at 581.
COMMENTS
Wylie had signed the contract as trustee for Atlas, and
therefore he argued that he should not be held individu-
ally liable on the agreement. The court found that the
contract by its own express terms was fatal to his defense;
in order to escape personal liability, Wylie was required to
assign the contract to Atlas.2 °3 Wylie admitted that he
never fulfilled this condition.2°
The court then discussed the trial court's use of the al-
ter ego doctrine to fasten liability on Wylie. 20 5 By finding
Wylie liable on the basis of the contract alone, the Tenth
Circuit strongly suggested that it deemed the application
of the alter ego doctrine unnecessary. Nevertheless, the
court upheld the lower court's findings that the identities
of Wylie and Atlas had merged and that separating them
would be inequitable. 0 6
Doyn Aircraft does more to confuse than to clarify the
standards for determining when to disregard the corpo-
rate entity. The court exhibited no general reluctance to
pierce the corporate veil. The Tenth Circuit observed
that Wylie clearly was liable under the terms of his con-
tract with Doyn.2 °7 Nevertheless, the court declined to
disturb the trial court's application of the alter ego doc-
trine because it did not "detect clear error. 20 8
The question thus arises why the trial court invoked the
alter ego doctrine, when basic contract law provided an
adequate remedy. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that
203 Id. at 583. The contract provided:
"It is expressly agreed and understood that this contract is being
made by JAMES C. WYLIE for the benefit of a corporation to be
formed, and all rights hereunder of the Distributor are assignable by the said
WYLIE, and upon such assignment and assumption of liabilities by the as-
signee, the said WYLIE shall not have any liability hereunder."
Id. (emphasis by the court).
204 Id.
20 Id. at 584.
2-6 Id. "In the dealings here relevant, the identities of the individual and the
corporatiom [sic] merged, and to segregate them as appellant desires would cause
an inequitable result. We cannot detect clear error in the trial court's findings."Id.
207 Id. at 583.
2- Id. at 584.
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the corporation was in its formative stage when the breach
of contract occurred, thus leading the court to conclude
that Wylie's intention in forming Atlas was not the legiti-
mate limitation of personal liability, but a fraudulent eva-
sion of liability. Apparently, the court decided as a matter
of public policy that the need to prevent fraud or injustice
outweighed the need to follow the general rule-to recog-
nize and uphold the corporate entity. Perhaps the court
decided that, because Atlas did not exist at the time Wylie
signed the contract, the need to recognize the corporate
entity was less important than it would have been had Wy-
lie signed the contract as agent of a de jure corporation.
In any event, the trial court's application of the alter ego
doctrine seems unnecessary to the finding of personal lia-
bility in this case, as the Tenth Circuit's opinion
implies.209
The cases examined in this section reveal some incon-
sistency among jurisdictions in the standards courts use to
decide whether to pierce the corporate veil. In Illinois the
corporate form will be disregarded at law as well as in eq-
uity, provided certain "variables are coupled with some
element of injustice or fundamental unfairness"; 2 0 how-
ever, how many variables and which ones must be proved
is not clear. In Delaware the courts "will not entirely dis-
regard" the corporate entity except when "unusual cir-
cumstances [so] require. "211 In the Gregory I case in New
York, the federal judge seemed inclined to apply the alter
ego theory as a matter of law, but left the question to a
jury on the facts.212 As stated in Lambert, Indiana's stan-
dard for reverse disregard is comparatively lax. A plaintiff
209 id. at 583-84.
2- Trans-Aircraft Sales, No. 88-C-1189, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1989) (1989 WL
27450).
21 1 Ronair, 693 F. Supp. at 11. The Ronair court did not define the requisite
unusual circumstances, but spoke only in general terms of "abuse[s] of the corpo-
rate form." It did, however, dismiss as unpersuasive allegations of domination of
corporate transactions, "oscillation" of funds, and gross undercapitalization. Id.
at 111-12. For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 171-177 and accompany-
ing text.
212 Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a discus-
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"must show both ownership and control of the corpora-
tion by the shareholder. 21 3 The Tenth Circuit affirmed a
more tenuous application of reverse disregard on purely
procedural grounds in Doyn.2 4 Applying Kansas law, the
district court found that courts could invoke the alter ego
doctrine when an individual knowingly used a corporation
to perpetrate fraud or injustice "on third persons dealing
with the corporation. '2 '- The stated standard was simply
not applicable in Doyn, which involved a contract with the
individual promoter of an as yet unformed corporation.
At least one treatise states that "[w]hen all material facts
are undisputed, application of the alter-ego doctrine is a
question of law.... However.... each case in which the
issue is raised should be regarded as sui generis, to be
decided in accordance with its own underlying facts
"216
Many courts recite Powell's list of significant control
factors in one form or another when deciding whether to
disregard the corporate entity. Unfortunately, quite a few
of those courts have become enshrouded in Justice Car-
dozo's mists of metaphor, and have lost sight of the
guideposts Powell provided. The factors are not obscure
legal propositions, but rather, basic facts concerning the
formation, ownership and operation of a corporation. Ac-
cording to Powell, some of the factors are more important
than others as evidence of complete dominion and con-
trol. l7 Yet courts often list the factors as if all the factors
carried equal weight. These courts ignore Powell's valua-
ble analysis, and instead apply their own generally unar-
ticulated formulas to decide whether the proper
combination of "factors" (read, "facts") is present in each
sion of the court's treatment of the alter ego theory, see supra notes 114-122 and
accompanying text.
2,-, Lambert, 519 N.E.2d at 747. The facts of the case revealed substantial iden-
tity of the corporation and Lambert individually. Id. at 748; see supra note 195.
214 Doyn, 443 F.2d at 584.
215 id.
216 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.95.
21 For a discussion of Powell's factors and guidelines, see supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text.
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case. Some courts also seem to weigh the control factors
against the gravity of the alleged injustice or wrong, as if
the egregiousness of the corporation's conduct has some
bearing on the degree of control exercised over the
corporation.
Courts should avoid such ad hoc determinations be-
cause they serve to obscure the standards for disregarding
the corporate form, rather than building on what by now
should be a well settled equitable doctrine. A better ap-
proach would be a return to the basics set forth by Powell.
The control factors should be examined in accordance
with his priority guidelines. Courts should categorically
decide the question of dominion and control before pro-
ceeding to the second and third elements of the instru-
mentality or alter ego test, namely, fraud or injustice as a
proximate cause of actual injury. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has been noticeably more diligent in this
approach than other courts, and its veil-piercing opinions
should be regarded as exemplary.21 8
IV. PIERCING MANAGEMENT'S CORPORATE VEIL IN LABOR
RELATIONS CASES
Labor-management relations constitute a specialized
area of law which affects, in varying degrees, every major
air carrier in the United States. One important aspect of
this body of law deals with the contracts between airline
corporations and the unions representing their employ-
ees. The Railway Labor Act 219 (RLA) sets forth the rules
governing the representation of airline employees for col-
lective bargaining purposes,2 2 0 and further provides for
dispute resolution when representation questions arise.
The National Mediation Board (NMB) is the exclusive fo-
2 For an analysis of two Seventh Circuit cases, see supra notes 47-75 and ac-
companying text.
219 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
2 The provisions of the RLA were made applicable to the fledgling airline in-
dustry in 1936. Act of 1936, ch. 166, § 201, 49 Stat. 1189, 1189 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1988)).
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rum for representation dispute resolution under the
RILA; 22 1 therefore, a federal court must dismiss such dis-
putes for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed such a
dismissal in Air Line Pilots Association International v. Texas
International Airlines. Noting that district courts may
have jurisdiction in a proper case to enforce a carrier's
duty to bargain, 2 the Second Circuit characterized this
case as "neither a pure representation dispute ... nor a
pure interference claim... ," the latter claim being justi-
ciable.2 4 The court then discussed the union's claim in
the context of applicable law, but held merely that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2 5
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) alleged that a corpo-
rate reorganization involving Texas International Air-
lines, Inc. (TXI) and a newly formed corporation, New
York Airlines, Inc. (New York Air) was designed to frus-
trate ALPA's representation of TXI's pilots.2 26 More spe-
cifically, the Second Circuit said that ALPA's allegations
were based on the assumption "that TXI and New York
Air should be treated as a single carrier," the very ques-
tion which the trial court had refused to decide. 2 7
The court primarily cited and discussed NMB decisions
where the Board had pierced the corporate veil for labor
representation purposes. 2 Of the NMB decisions cited
by the court, the matters of Republic Airlines, Inc.22 9 and
2' Section 2, Ninth of the RLA provides thai the exclusive forum for resolution
of disputes concerning who are the authorized representatives of a carrier's em-
ployees shall be the National Mediation Board. Railway Labor Act, § 2, Ninth, 45
U.S.C. § 152, Ninth.*
- 656 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter ALPA v. TXI].
-3 Id at 18.
224 Id
2 Id. at 22-24.
226 Id at 17.
227 Id at 19.
228 Id at 22. The court also stated that TXI could not "permissibly transfer
existing business flown by ALPA pilots to a newly formed corporate alter ego for
the purpose of displacing the work of ALPA pilots." Id at 19, (citing Ruby v.
TACA Int'l Airlines, 439 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1971)).
2- 8 N.M.B. No. 15 (Oct. 14, 1980).
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Pan American World Airways, Inc. 230 are particularly relevant
here.
In Republic, the issue was whether the CAB-approved
acquisition of Hughes Airwest (Airwest) by Republic Air-
lines, a transaction deliberately structured to preserve the
corporate identity of Airwest, resulted in a single carrier
for labor representation purposes."1 The NMB so found,
and stated tersely: "The CAB may approve of a two cor-
poration set-up for purposes of economic regulation,
however, this Board may pierce the corporate veil for purposes of
rational labor-management relations. A finding that Republic
West is a separate carrier would exalt form over
substance." 2
In Pan American, the NMB denied a request from the air-
line to dismiss a representation dispute filed by the Air
Line Employees Association (ALEA) after a corporate re-
organization of Pan Am.2 3 3 The Board advised Pan Am
that, in effect, it would pierce the corporate veil of the re-
organized airline in order to protect the bargaining rights
of employees under the RLA. 3 4
230 7 N.M.B. No. 92 (Dec. 28, 1979).
23, Republic, 8 N.M.B. No. 15, at 50. The ALPA v. TXI opinion unfortunately
obscures the issue by referring to the acquisition as a "merger." Although the
word appropriately describes the practical effect of the acquisition, the issue at
hand would have been rendered moot by a legal merger of the two corporations.
See ALPA v. TXI, 656 F.2d at 22.
232 Republic, 8 N.M.B. No. 15, at 55-56 (emphasis added). "Republic West" was
the legal name of the newly-acquired subsidiary; however the CAB applications
revealed that Republic sought "to operate Airwest as a subsidiary known as 'Re-
public West d/b/a/ Republic.' Republic also applied for unlimited authority to
transfer assets between Republic and Republic West, and to have common direc-
tors." Id. at 52; cf F. POWELL, supra notes 27-28, at 9, and accompanying text (list
of factors for determining parent's control over subsidiary).
233 Pan American, 7 N.M.B. No. 92, at 170. ALEA applied to the NMB for an
investigation of a representation dispute among employees of "Pan American
U.S.A. Inc." ALEA's transmittal letter "clearly indicate[d] the intent to seek an
election among employees of the carrier entity resulting from the merger of Pan
American World Airways, Inc. and National Airlines, Inc." Id,
234 Id.
The [RLA] does not contemplate that carriers will be able to frus-
trate such rights by the use of corporate shells which were in fact
created for other purposes and the National Mediation Board will
look behind such devices to determine the appropriate operating en-
Even though the NMB decisions discussed above came
early in the era of airline deregulation, the Board clearly
stated its position on the recognition of related corporate
entities in the 1980 Republic findings.2 5 In essence, the
Board stated that it intended to learn from its mistakes, or
at least its lack of sophistication, in dealing with the effects
of railroad mergers and acquisitions on labor representa-
tion.2 6 The Board went on to adopt a policy of judging
each case on an ad hoc basis to avoid, as far as possible,
fostering a "pattern of representation in the airline indus-
try" similar to that in the railroad industry.2 37 Thus, in
the field of labor relations the National Mediation Board
follows the sui generis approach often seen in court adju-
dications: where the question whether to pierce the cor-
porate veil arises, the facts of each individual case are
controlling. 5 8
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING
CORPORATE DISREGARD
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Texas broke new
ground in the area of disregard of the corporate entity
with its decision in Castlebery v. Branscum.239 The 5-4 deci-
sion provoked immediate criticism for its relaxation of the
requirements for finding shareholders liable to corporate
creditors.2 4 ° In 1989, the Texas Legislature limited the
impact of the decision by amending the Texas Business
tity thereby allowing employees the rights which are granted to
them.
Id. at 170, cited with approval in ALPA v. TXI, 656 F.2d at 22.
235 Republic, 8 N.M.B. No. 15, at 54-56.
236 Id. "The pattern of representation which has resulted in the railroad indus-
try has, in the Board's judgment led to uneven representation, duplication of ef-
fort, and confusion ..... Id. at 54.
237 Id. at 55. "In the absence of compelling facts,judged in each instance on a case-
by-case consideration of the situation presented, the Board does not intend to foster a
similar pattern of representation in the airline industry." Id. (emphasis added).
238 See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.95.
2,9 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986), reh'gdenied, Jan. 14, 1987.
240 Shearn, Must Contract Creditors Only Show Inequity to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 6
CORP. CouNs. REV. 43 (1987) (edited version of amicus brief submitted to Texas
Supreme Court in support of motion for rehearing).
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Corporation Act to protect shareholders from personal li-
ability on the specific grounds underlying the Castleberry
holding.24 '
Castlebey was an action to collect a promissory note re-
lated to a stock purchase agreement. In 1980, Castleberry
and the two individual defendants, Branscum and Byboth,
formed the corporate defendant, Texan Transfer, Inc.
Each individual owned one third of the stock. In 1981,
Castleberry sold his stock back to the corporation, taking
a promissory note signed by Byboth in his capacity as
president of the corporation. After the corporation de-
faulted on the note, Castleberry sued the corporation and
the two remaining owners. The jury found the corpora-
tion was the alter ego of Branscum and Byboth and held
them personally liable on the note. 42 The court of ap-
peals reversed as to the individual defendants, finding in-
adequate grounds for piercing the corporate veil. 43 The
supreme court reversed again and affirmed the trial
court's judgment. 244
The supreme court, however, distinguished alter ego as
only one of several theories for disregarding the corpo-
rate entity, and stated that the applicable theory here was
"a sham to perpetrate a fraud. ' 2 45 The court construed
the sham theory to encompass constructive fraud, which it
defined as "the breach of some legal or equitable duty
which ... the law declares fraudulent because of its ten-
dency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure
public interests. 2 46 The court also cited an earlier deci-
sion in an alter ego case in which it held that it would
"disregard the corporate fiction when the 'facts are such
24 See TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
242 Castleberny, 721 S.W.2d at 271.
24. Branscum v. Castleberry, 695 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App. 1985), rev'd, 721
S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
244 Castlebeny, 721 S.W.2d at 277.
24- Id at 272. The trial court's instruction to the jury included "sham to perpe-
trate fraud" as an alternative element of the alter ego theory. Id. at 275-76.
240 Id. at 273; see also Shearn, supra note 240, at 50 ("The majority appears to
have created a new equitable doctrine, a 'sham to perpetrate a constructive fraud,'
.. ..").
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that adherence to the fiction would promote injustice and
lead to an inequitable result.' ",247 After reviewing the
facts, the court held that there was "some evidence of a
sham to perpetrate a fraud," and affirmed the jury's ver-
dict.248 Much of the majority opinion dealt with perceived
procedural defects in the trial and appeal, an approach
the dissent characterized as "hypertechnical. ' 249
In an obvious response to Castlebeny and its progeny,
the Texas Legislature amended article 2.21 of the Texas
Business Corporation Act in 1989.250 The legislature ex-
panded the Act to expressly preclude shareholder liability
in contract cases on the grounds used in Castlebey.251
The public policy of encouraging business formation and
capital investment was too vital to the troubled Texas
economy to allow the court's decision to stand as a dan-
gerous new precedent for shareholder liability. 52 Prior to
1989, article 2.21(A) provided for limited liability of
shareholders and subscribers as follows:
A holder of a certificate of shares or a subscriber whose
subscription has been accepted shall be under no obliga-
tion to the corporation or to its creditors with respect to
such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corpo-
ration the full amount of the consideration, fixed as pro-
vided by law, for which such shares were issued or to be
issued.253
The 1989 amendments added language which expressly
precludes shareholder liability on "contractual obliga-
tion[s] of the corporation on the basis of... constructive
247 Castberyy, 721 S.W.2d at 273 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 134 Tex.
112, 122, 132 S.W.2d 100, 105 (1939)).
248 id. at 275.
249 Id at 281 (Gonzalez, J,, dissenting).
2-0 Act effective Aug. 28, 1989, ch. 217, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 974 (codified
at TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
251 See TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
252 See Shearn, supra note 240, at 52-53.
2s3 TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1989).
Section B concerned liability of assignees of shares; section C limited personal
liability of trustees and other fiduciaries; and section D addressed "holder[s] of
shares as collateral security." Id
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fraud, or a sham to perpetrate a fraud .... ,2 54 The same
clause provides an exception in cases of actual fraud, but
the plaintiff must prove intent, causation, and "direct per-
sonal benefit" on the part of the defendant
shareholder. 55
In addition, the amended statute precludes shareholder
liability based on any non-observance of corporate for-
malities; this clause is also limited to contractual obliga-
tions of the corporation. 56  Because the statutory
amendments are limited to contractual obligations of cor-
porations, the legislature did not disturb Texas's corpo-
rate disregard theory in tort and other non-contractual
2- Article 2.21 now reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
A. A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares,
or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted
shall be under no obligation to the corporation or to its obligees
with respect to:
(1) such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation
the full amount of the consideration, fixed in compliance with Article
2.15 of this Act, for which such shares were or are to be issued;
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis of
actual or constructive fraud, or a sham to perpetrate a fraud, unless
the obligee demonstrates that the holder, owner, or subscriber
caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating
and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the
direct personal benefit of the holder, owner, or subscriber; or
(3) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis of
the failure of the corporation to observe any corporate formality,
including without limitation: (a) the failure to comply with any re-
quirement of this Act or of the articles of incorporation or bylaws of
the corporation; or (b) the failure to observe any requirement pre-
scribed by this Act or by the articles of incorporation or bylaws for
acts to be taken by the corporation, its board of directors, or its
shareholders.
B. Nothing contained in this article shall limit the obligation of a
holder, owner, or subscriber to an obligee of the corporation when:
(1) the holder, owner, or subscriber has expressly assumed, guar-
anteed or agreed to be personally liable to the obligee for the obli-
gation; or
(2) the holder, owner, or subscriber is otherwise liable to the obli-
gee for the obligation under this Act or another applicable statute.
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 (A) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (footnotes omitted).
Sections C, D, and E correspond to former sections B, C, and D, and remain sub-
stantially unchanged in the amended statute. See id.
25.1 Id. art. 2.21 (A).
256 Id. art. 2.21(A)(3).
cases. In retrospect, the legislative response to Castlebery
was little more than a codification of pre-1986 Texas com-
mon law on corporate disregard theory. Nevertheless, the
current Texas statute goes well beyond any other state's
corporation statutes towards limiting liability of
shareholders.
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) is a use-
ful benchmark for comparing state statutes. Section
6.22(a) of the MBCA provides:
A purchaser from a corporation of its own shares is not
liable to the corporation or its creditors with respect to the
shares except to pay the consideration for which the
shares were authorized to be issued (section 6.21) or spec-
ified in the subscription agreement (section 6.20).257
Article 2.21 (A) of the pre- 1989 Texas statute was substan-
tively the same as the MBCA provision.2 58 According to
the statutory comparison included in the annotated
MBCA, all states have statutes comparable to section
6.22(a). 59 Section 6.22(b) of the MBCA further provides
for the traditional limited liability of shareholders as to
corporate creditors, but it also contains an exception leav-
ing the door open to pierce the corporate veil. 6°
257 REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(a) (1984), reprinted in I MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION AT ANNOTATED (3d ed. 1991).
25. Cf TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.2 1(A) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1989);
see supra note 252 and accompanying text.
25" 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AT ANNOTATED 389 (3d ed. 1991) (Statu-
tory Comparison as of Nov. 26, 1990).
26 REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a share-
holder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts
of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by
reason of his own acts or conduct.
Id. The historical background in the annotation explains:
The present section 6.22(b) was ... added to make express the basic
rule of nonliability of shareholders for corporate obligations ...
Shareholders may . . . become liable for corporate obligations by
their voluntary actions or by other conduct under the common law
doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil."
I MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED, supra note 259, at 387. Only
nine states-Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee and Wyoming-have adopted section 6.22(b). Id. at
390.
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Nowhere but Texas las a legislature specifically limited
the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil.2 6' Whether other states will enact similar legislative
protection for corporate shareholders will depend, as it
did in Texas, upon how far their courts will go in creating
exceptions to the well-established rule of limited liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the law regards the corporation as a legal en-
tity separate and distinct from its shareholders, the gen-
eral rule is that shareholder liability is limited to the
consideration paid (or agreed to be paid) for corporate
stock.262 But, because the entity concept is an elaborate
legal fiction, equity provides an exception to the general
rule of limited liability by allowing courts to pierce the
corporate veil in appropriate cases. 263 The difficulty for
plaintiffs and defendants alike lies in identifying "appro-
priate" cases.
Courts often cite a laundry list of factors to be consid-
ered in deciding whether to disregard the corporate fic-
tion. Unfortunately, very few courts define the "proper
combination" of factors that a litigant must show.2 4
Aside from the general reluctance of courts to make ex-
ceptions to the rule of limited liability, what is clear
through the "mists of metaphor" is that many courts de-
cide each case sui generis.2 65 This ad hoc approach is
puzzling, because the original source of the factors which
courts frequently cite also includes guidelines for inter-
preting those factors. Few courts recognize and follow
the guidelines. A great deal of confusion and uncertainty
about the proper grounds for veil piercing could be elimi-
nated if all courts would adhere to the same basic guide-
261 A survey of the corporation statutes of the other 49 states, as listed in 1
MODEL BuSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED, supra note 259, at 387-89, reveals
no such provisions.
262 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 210-218 and accompanying text.
lines. Such a uniform approach might discourage
overreaching by plaintiffs and thus reduce unnecessary
litigation.
Most courts will not pierce the corporate veil of a sub-
sidiary in a defensive posture. In other words, a subsidi-
ary usually cannot claim identity with its parent
corporation in order to enjoy the statutory immunity of
the parent from tort actions provided by workers' com-
pensation acts.266 Thus, a serious concern exists for cor-
porations that elect to own and operate private aircraft.
The federal government requires aircraft based in the
United States to be owned and registered by United
States citizens.26 7 If substantial ownership or control of
the corporation vests in aliens, the corporation must
transfer the aircraft to another entity that fulfills the citi-
zenship requirements, typically a subsidiary. Once the
new subsidiary leaves the womb, it loses the protection of
the parent's statutory tort immunity.268
Whether Congress should modify or abolish aircraft re-
gistration citizenship requirements, in light of the realities
of modern business relationships, is a current issue with
ramifications beyond the scope of this comment. At least
on the question of corporate veil-piercing, however,
courts ought to look through form to substance and ex-
amine the reasons underlying the formation of a subsidi-
ary. If the only reason was compliance with federal
aircraft registration regulations, and in all other respects
the subsidiary is a mere department of its parent, a court
should not penalize the subsidiary by imposing on it lia-
bility from which it would otherwise be immune.
From a plaintiff's perspective, "reverse disregard" is a
means of holding a corporation liable for the acts or obli-
gations of a shareholder. 269 A creditor suing an individual
21W! See supra notes 98-122 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
2- The subsidiary, of course, has its own immunity vis-a-vis its own employees,
but this provides little comfort if the subsidiary's primary business is transporting
employees of the parent corporation.
211.1 See supra notes 187-196 and accompanying text.
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debtor may allege that the debtor's corporation is merely
an alter ego that the debtor used fraudulently to shelter
personal assets.270 This approach has been more success-
ful than the defensive "reverse pierce," but the question
arises whether it is necessary to pierce the corporate veil if
the transfer of assets to the corporation was fraudulent as
to creditors ab initio.27' Given the statutory and common-
law remedies for fraudulent transfers, the "reverse
pierce" here seems to be no more than one of the enslav-
ing metaphors of which Justice Cardozo warned. 72
In any case where law or equity provides an adequate
remedy without piercing the corporate veil, the courts
should refrain from the extraordinary step of abrogating
limited liability. The public policy supporting limited lia-
bility of corporations is as valid today as it was in Justice
Cardozo's time. If courts truly mean to advance that pol-
icy, they should make every effort to find remedies for in-
jured plaintiffs that preserve corporate identity.
The National Mediation Board has pierced the corpo-
rate veil in the context of airline labor relations.2 " Pierc-
ing the corporate veil for collective bargaining purposes is
not inconsistent with a general policy of respecting corpo-
rate identity. The policy question in labor relations cases
is whether recognition of technically separate corporate
entities exalts form over substance. The issue here turns
on the statutory duty to bargain, and is not a question of
liability for injury or wrong. Efficient exercise of an air-
line's duty to bargain demands that the economic realities
of the corporate hierarchy take precedence over the tech-
nical form.
If the typical language of corporation statutes is any in-
dication, most state legislatures seem to regard judicial re-
luctance to apply the corporate disregard doctrine as
27o See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
272 For Justice Cardozo's discussion of metaphors, see supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 219-238 and accompanying text.
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adequate protection of shareholders' limited liability.27 4
The Texas Legislature, however, decided in 1989 that the
Texas Supreme Court had gone too far in a recent veil-
piercing case.275 In response, the legislature amended the
Texas Business Corporation Act to expressly exclude cer-
tain grounds for holding shareholders liable. 6 Whether
other states will follow Texas in providing more explicit
statutory protection for shareholders remains to be seen.
Each legislature should examine the current state of au-
thority in corporate veil adjudications with a watchful eye
for any trend toward a relaxation of standards for impos-
ing shareholder liability. Such a trend may well be a sig-
nal to the legislature to reaffirm its policy on limited
liability, perhaps by explicitly defining a threshold of con-
duct necessary to disregard the corporate entity.
27. See supra notes 257-261 and accompanying text.
275 Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986); see supra notes 239-
249 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 241, 250-256 and accompanying text.
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